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Restructuring Italian Utility Markets: Household Distributional Effects 
 
Summary 
Competition in public utility sectors has been encouraged in recent years throughout 
Europe. In this paper we try and analyse the welfare effects of these reforms in Italy, 
with particular attention to water and energy goods. The first step is to introduce a 
sensible measure of affordability of public utilities and to see how many households fall 
below a critical threshold. This issue is analysed stressing how climatic conditions 
dramatically affect households’ expenditure and how the affordability of utility bills 
varies a lot from region to region. So far, utilities’ reforms do not seem to have 
produced negative effects on the weaker group of households. 
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1  Introduction 
In Italy, as in other European countries, regulatory reforms in public utilities have 
been  introduced  since  the  beginning  of  the  '90.  Progress  in  European  integration, 
technological developments and the deterioration of public finances represent the main 
driving forces of this wide reform process. Moreover, the importance of competition as 
a factor which foster price decreases and promotes efficiency has been more widely 
recognised,  while  the  natural  monopoly  and  competitive  elements  are  more  clearly 
distinguished. Thus, the current process is characterised by (a) liberalisation aimed at 
allowing  the  entry  of  new  operators  and  (b)  distinction  (“unbundling”)  between 
naturally monopolistic segments and (potentially) competitive ones. Sometimes we also 
observe a change in ownership from public to private hands. 
Given that these utilities are considered essential services, equity considerations 
make it particularly desirable that their provision at affordable prices is warranted. As a 
household’s  expenditure  in  utility  services  increases  with  income,  but  less  than 
proportionally - demand elasticity with respect to income is positive, but typically very 
low – tariff changes produce relevant distributional effects. Therefore, reforms must 
strike a balance between the pursuit of efficiency and equity objectives.  
The economic literature on the effects of regulatory reforms on household utility 
markets mainly develops over two strands. The first one investigates these effects in 
particular industries: the distributional impact of reforms is assessed by Wolak (1996) in 
US telecommunication, by Waddams Price and Hancock (1998) and Waddams Price 
(2005) in UK energy markets, by Gòmez-Lobo (1996) in the UK gas market. Florio 
(2004)  analyses  more  general  welfare  consequences  of  the  whole  UK  privatisation 
programme.  Another  part  of  the  literature  focuses  on  the  definition  of  fuel  poverty 
and/or the affordability of public utility bills in different countries and evaluates the 
impact of different schemes of distributive grant. Healy (2001) describes fuel poverty in 
different European countries; McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) analyse the effect of 
privatisation  and  restructuring  of  private  utilities  in  four  Latin  American  countries, 
showing how the effects on consumers are quite mixed but usually favourable. 
Italian reforms have not given clear results so far, and in this paper we first try and 
provide  some  evidence  on  the  incidence  of  expenditure  for  basic  utilities  (water, 
electricity, natural gas, and other fuels for home heating) for Italian households. This is 
a necessary step before any tentative evaluation of the effects of the liberalisation of the 
utility markets on households’ welfare. We then propose a definition of utility poverty 
(a  poverty  line  referred  to  expenditure  in  basic  public  utilities)  and  estimate  the 
phenomenon in Italy, trying to show how liberalisation has affected weaker households. 
 
To understand our choice of sectors, one should consider that among the different 
services  involved  in  the  process  of  utilities  restructuring  in  Italy,  we  have  different 
stories. Telecommunications are heavily liberalised, competition – although limited by 
the presence of a dominant firm – operates quite widely, and consumers benefit from 
considerable  service  improvements  as  well  as  price  decreases.  This  can  now  be 
considered a competitive sector (although with notable imperfections) and regulation is 
taking a secondary role.  
Public  transport  is  instead  way  behind,  both  locally  and  nationally.  The 
restructuring of the train service has only begun, with mainly cosmetic interventions on   3 
the dominant firm, absence of  a clear regulation (prices are still set by a Governmental 
body with very obscure criteria), only an embryo of competition for the market
1. Public 
subsidies are still widespread, and  market orientation is a principle present only  on 
paper. 
Other  sectors  –  such  as  water  and  energy  –  seem  to  be  more  interesting,  as 
technological progress cannot get rid of regulation altogether, but restructuring is fairly 
well developed. This is why we concentrate on these cases, where the concern for the 
consumers is still strong, but where however the principle that prices should cover costs 
is well rooted. This quite naturally raises a question of whether consumers suffer for the 
elimination (or reduction) of public subsidies, or rather benefit from greater efficiency, 
and of how these possible costs and benefits are spread across the population. 
 
More precisely, we study the distribution of expenditure and shares over total 
expenditure, conditional on demographic, climate and welfare indicators; we provide 
evidence on the inadequacy of the thresholds used by the official absolute poverty lines 
for heating and electricity expenditures; and we discuss the relevance of the standard 
sustainability thresholds for water expenditure for the Italian case.  
First of all, we can see that the average family spends for the different basic utility 
services 5 to 6% of its total expenditure. This figure varies both with regional income 
and with climatic conditions. Moreover, while electricity prices for small consumers are 
uniform nationally, we can document a substantial variability of water and gas prices 
across Italian regions. 
After  this  analysis  of  data,  we  provide  evidence  on  the  inadequacy  of  the 
thresholds  used  by  the  official  absolute  poverty  lines  for  heating  and  electricity 
expenditures; and we discuss the relevance of the standard sustainability thresholds for 
water  expenditure  for  the  Italian  case.  We  propose  a  definition  of  a  (relative) 
affordability line, which we differentiate by family size, region and climatic area. More 
precisely, we study the distribution of expenditure and shares over total expenditure, 
conditional on demographic, climate and welfare indicators;  
We can show that about 15% of Italian families fall below this line. Given a 
minimum consumption level, defined by the affordability line at the beginning of the 
period considered, we then investigate how utility poverty evolves over time because of 
price  and  income  variability.  This  indicates  that  over  the  period  1997-2002  the 
restructuring  of  Italian  utilities  has  not  damaged  consumers,  especially  in  energy 
sectors. In the water sector the need to fund large investment has made price increases 
necessary, and this certainly affects consumers’ welfare in a non negligible way. 
 
The next section discusses the concepts of poverty which can be used in this 
analysis. Section 3 describes the development of liberalisation reforms in Italy and the 
new regulation in water and energy. Section 4 illustrates the data and the methodology 
of our analysis. Section 5 shows the main results on the distributional effects of utilities 
restructuring. Section 6 discussing possible extension of the present analysis concludes 
the paper. 
 
                                                 
1 A very similar story could be told about local transport services.   4 
2  Public utilities and poverty 
The  relevance  of  public  utilities  in  the  consumption  basket  of  households  is 
widely  recognised,  so  that  public  service  obligations  are  usually  imposed  on  firms 
operating in these sectors. The attention by the literature on whether people can afford a 
proper level of basic services and the impact of utility prices on consumers’ welfare is 
thus  quite  rich.  To  this  end,  numerous  different  approaches  may  be  considered 
legitimate. In particular, the notion of fuel poverty is often introduced, referring to the 
problems connected to consumers’ ability to afford gas and electricity. Although here 
we focus on water as well, it may be useful to start our discussion from this notion. 
One  of  the  first  definitions  of  fuel  poverty  is  given  by  Lewis  (1982)  as  “the 
inability  to  afford  adequate  warmth  in  the  home”.  Boardman  (1991)  refined  this 
definition to “the inability to afford adequate heat because of energy inefficiency in the 
home”. Operationally, the British Government assumes that “a household is in fuel 
poverty if, in order to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, it would require to spend 
more than 10% of its income on all household fuel use.” (DEFRA, 2001). 
There  is  no  doubt  that  fuel  poverty  is  a  manifestation  –  and  indicator  –  of 
deprivation and social exclusion. But its role in the debate on households’ welfare is due 
to  the  fact  that  fuel  poverty  is  originated  by  an  interaction  between  low  income, 
relatively high fuel consumption (possibly due to climatic reasons) and poor thermal 
efficiency in housing. To assess the relative importance of these factors, let consider the 
evidence provided by Healy (2001), who exploits the 1996 edition of the European 
Community Household Panel to compare subjective and objective indicators of fuel 
poverty across European countries.  
 
Table 2-1: Subjective and objective indicators of fuel poverty status. 
  % of Households Declaring 
 
Inability to Afford 













D  1.4  1.5  3.7  6.4  4.2 
DK  2.8  2.4  4.1  6.5  5.8 
NL  2  1.2  6.9  9.8  9.8 
B  2.8  6.9  8.1  12.3  8.7 
L  3.5  2.8  5.6  7.2  4.4 
F  7  7.3  10.3  14.6  9.7 
UK  5.3  1  9.1  12.2  11.6 
IRL  6.5  6.1  7.6  8.9  7 
I  20.6  4.5  16.1  4.8  5.2 
EL  46.8  1.4  30.8  18.5  8.5 
E  53.3  3.7  1.3  20.4  6.4 
P  73.8  1.7  40.1  33.5  25 
A  2.2  1.1  6.7  8.3  4.4 
FIN  4.7  11.4  3  3.9  2.5 
EU-14  16.6  3.8  11  12  8.1 
Source: Healy, 2001. 
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Table 2-1 show that 16.6% of European households declare not to be able to 
afford  adequate  heat  in  the  home  (20.6%  of  Italian  households),  with  the  warmer 
southern countries recording the highest share of households with self-reported heating 
problems. The fraction of households facing problems with utility bills is only 3.8% 
(4.5% in Italy), but 11% of the households lack adequate heating facilities (16.1% in 
Italy). That means, for instance, that income benefits, “fuel stamps” or subsidized tariffs 
alone might be not effective in reducing fuel poverty. According to Healy (2001) “fuel 
poverty requires additional help to be eradicated; the most effective way to do this is to 
invest  in  the  capital  stock  (the  home  itself,  its  heating  system  and  energy-using 
equipment).”    But  “low-income  homes  realise  the  benefits  of  such  programmes  as 
increased household warmth, while better-off homes take the benefits as fuel savings, 
leading  to  the  conclusion  that  many  low-income  households  exhibit  fuel-poor 
characteristics.”  
Studying how fuel poverty affects different households - for demographic and 
housing characteristics - is crucial to choose the best policy mix to fight against social 
exclusion. Tariff structures are among the instruments available to the policy maker, in 
particular when, as in the case of Italy, the liberalization of the utilities market is at its 
beginning.   
In fact, fuel poverty is recognized as an issue by some European governments 
(Great Britain and Ireland among others), and official statistics are available for those 
countries (see DEFRA, 2001 for the UK). At the best of our knowledge, there is no 
official definition of fuel poverty in Italy. Official statistics on poverty rely on total 
expenditure: a household is defined as relatively poor if its total expenditure falls below 
the relative poverty line, and the absolutely poor families are those whose consumption 
falls below the absolute poverty line. The two concepts of poverty are very different: the 
relative poverty line for a couple is given by the average per capita expenditure; the 
absolute poverty line has been estimated by the Italian Poverty Commission in 1997 and 
it is based on a basket of goods and services considered to be essential for a decent 
standard of living (ISTAT 2004). Both lines take into account differences in family size, 
and the absolute poverty line is adjusted every year by simply using the Consumer Price 
Index.  Both  have  advantages  and  pitfalls:  the  relative  poverty  line  can  be  easily 
identified and estimated, but it is not particularly useful to set policy targets (when the 
expenditure distribution moves because of a recession, the poverty line automatically 
moves downward, and the number of relatively poor might be almost unaffected by the 
recession event); the absolute poverty line is useful for policy purposes, it refers to a 
clear cut idea (the basket of essential goods), but it is difficult to identify and to estimate 
in practice. 
The reference basket used to define the absolute poverty line includes heating, 
electricity, and water. Therefore, this basket explicitly sets a minimum expenditure in 
utilities, which is deemed to be necessary for a decent standard of living. This is what 
the British government does by estimating the cost “to maintain a satisfactory heating 
regime”, which in turn is set by the World Health Organization, and by using it in its 
definition of fuel poverty
2.  
                                                 
2 The Italian Poverty Commission (Istat, 2004) uses a similar standard approach for food.   6 
In  Italy  there  is  no  official  estimate  of  this  minimum  amount
3,  so  the  Italian 
Poverty Commission fixed the minimum expenditure for heating and electricity to be 
equal to the first quartile of the national distribution of the expenditure for natural gas 
and electricity, conditional on household size. That is, the Commission resorted to what 
may indeed be considered as a minimum socially acceptable expenditure needed for not 
being poor; this is not related to a minimum standard of living defined by medical 
and/or physical parameters
4, so that absolute and relative poverty measures are mixed.  
 
Water is another necessary good whose consumption may cause social concern. 
The OECD (2003) shows (see Table 2-2) that water affordability can be an issue also in 
major industrialized countries. Countries in which households spend a higher share of 
their income for water, are not necessary those in which water affordability is an issue: 
in the Netherlands 1.42% of Dutch households income was spent for water in 1999, v. 
0.85% for England and Wales in the same period. The Organization arguments that 
“three  main  factors  probably  affect  perception  that  affordability  is,  or  is  not,  a 
significant  issue.  First,  is  the  extent  of  relative  poverty  (…).  Second,  if  good  water 
resources are plentiful and household water services relatively cheap (…). Third, past 
neglect  of  water  service  infrastructure  may  lead  to  high  water  charges  to  recoup 
rehabilitation costs, putting a significant burden on a particular generation ….”   
Italy’s poverty indicators displayed relatively worse figures (i.e. its head-count 
ratios and income gap ratio were above the average of the countries considered), but this 
was compensated by the fact that in the mid-1990s water was cheap and investment in 
water services infrastructure had been negligible for a long time.  
 
Table 2-2: Government perception of  affordability problems and measures/structures in place. 











Australia, Ireland, Japan, 
Italy, US 
No such affordability 
measures/structures directly applied 
to water bills in place 





Source: OECD (2003) 
 
As in the case of fuels, it is difficult to define a suitable indicator of affordability. 
One option is to look at the number of households that spend more than 3% of their 
budget  for  water  bills.  This  threshold  was  first  introduced  in  1999  by  the  UK 
                                                 
3 Government, workers and consumers unions use in their simulations the “standard” annual consumption 
for natural gas for Northern (1400 mc) and Southern (900 mc) households. These figures have to do with 
the average consumption, not to the minimum necessary consumption. 
4 Moreover, as we will stress later, the Italian definition contains a serious limitation in this measure, 
which does not consider – for instance – the climatic conditions of each area of the country.   7 
government “for illustrative purposes”,  and it is about the 1999/00 average ratio of  the 
expenditure on water charges over income of the households in the three lowest-income 
decile  groups.  The  US  Environmental  Protection  Agency  defines  the  affordability 
threshold as the 2.5% of the median household income. The 2.5% limit was obtained by 
comparing the cost of household public water supply with other household expenditure 
and that of alternative risk-averting behaviour (e.g. treatment at household level, home 
delivery of bottled water). In both cases the thresholds do not refer to any minimum 
quantity  of  water  considered  to  be  necessary  for  avoiding  health  risks  and  social 
exclusion. In Italy there are few studies on households’ water expenditure (see Barone, 
2004, and Peruzzi, 2003) and no official definition of affordability. Water charges are 
not explicitly included in the absolute poverty line, and few statistics are available on 
the quantities consumed by the households (see ISTAT , 2003). 
 
In the following, we suggest a unified approach to study deprivation phenomena 
related to the consumption of necessary utilities such as water, electricity and heating. 
The basic idea is that if a household needs to spend more than a given share of its 
budget to afford what is considered to be a minimum expenditure for not being deprived 
with respect to that utility, then that household has an affordability problem and it can 
be considered in water, electricity or fuel poverty. 
In order to implement this idea, we first need to define the minimum expenditures. We 
have two possibilities:  
1.  we  can  adopt  the  absolute  poverty  framework  and  refer  to  medical  and/or 
physical parameters to define the minimum quantity 
A
h q  for the household type h 
(where the types h differ at least for family size).  
2.  we can choose to work in a relative poverty framework and define the minimum 
quantity 
S
h q   as  the  minimum  acceptable  consumption  for  not  being  socially 
excluded.  
The  first  option  is  the  one  adopted  in  the  British  context  for  the  definition  of  fuel 
poverty, and it is difficult to apply it in Italy as there are no households surveys useful to 
estimate 
A
h q .  Nevertheless  “educated  guesses”  for 
A
h q   may  be  useful  as  well.  The 
second one is implicitly adopted by the Italian Poverty Commission for electricity and 
heating,  and  we  shall  discuss  in  Section  5  to  what  extent  their  estimates  can  be 
considered satisfactory for our purposes.  
Once the minimum expenditure is fixed, the threshold for the budget share needs 
to be chosen, that is, we have to decide the maximum budget share ( h w ) above which 
the  household  is  considered  to  have  an  affordability  problem  with  respect  to  that 
specific utility. If  ih E  denotes the total expenditure, the household has and affordability 











where  ( )
A
h q p  is the price paid for the quantity 
A
h q  for households of type h. The price 
depends on quantity and household type because prices are non linear and they vary 
across areas. In practice, we choose  h w  to be equal to the average of the ratio on the left 
hand  side  for  low  income  households,  which  in  turn  are  defined  as  those  whose 
equivalent total expenditure is below the 25
th percentile.    8 
Notice that we do not consider whether the actual consumption of the household 
is affordable, but whether the minimum quantity 
A
h q  or 
S
h q  – which can be larger or 
smaller that the quantity actually consumed by the household i of type h ( ih q ) – can be 
purchased without budget problems. This makes our results about water affordability 









considered so far, for instance, by OECD (2003).  
In Section 5 we provide our estimates of the minimum acceptable expenditure for 
not being socially excluded in Italy and of the budget share threshold for affordability of 
the water and energy tariffs in 2002.  
3  Utilities restructuring in Italy 
The market design in the European utility sectors has recently evolved, leaving 
more  space  to  competition.  This  is  supposed  to  benefit  consumers  by  enhancing 
productive efficiency and technological innovation – and in turn inducing lower prices - 
and by increasing the variety and quality of products/services. Within this set-up, the 
privatisation and liberalisation of utility sectors have started in Italy with some caution, 
given that Italy has been traditionally attached to public ownership of public utilities 
and direct control of services.  
Quite naturally, the starting conditions and technological constraints vary greatly 
from  sector  to  sector,  and  analogously  the  degree  of  competition  which  could  be 
implemented  varies  across  sectors.  Markets  are  difficult  to  open  up  when  there  are 
natural monopolies where the capacity of the infrastructural elements is limited or when 
the service has been heavily subsidised in the past. If economies of scale or of scope 
between the vertical stages are relevant, the greater efficiency of vertical integration 
may outweigh the benefit from “unbundling” – which is often seen as a pre-condition of 
competition
5. 
This  quite  naturally  raises  a  question  of  whether  consumers  suffer  for  the 
elimination (or reduction) of public subsidies, or rather benefit from greater efficiency, 
and  of  how  these  possible  costs  and  benefits  are  spread  across  the  population.  To 
address this question, in what follows we briefly present the features of the reforms 
specifically belonging to the Italian water, electricity and gas sectors, mainly focussing 
on how reforms have affected price changes. 
3.1   Water 
 
The water service has always been considered a local service, and only since 1990 
(law 142/90) may the service be provided by limited companies. In such a fragmented 
sector data have always been little more than approximations, but it is reckoned that in 
1996 about 8,100 independent subjects were managing at least one part of the water 
service in the country
6. About 50% of the population was getting water services directly 
                                                 
5 It is worthwhile to stress here that network utility such as electricity, water and gas are characterised by 
natural monopoly which is essential for the delivery of the service to final consumers. 
6 Bardelli and Muraro (2003).   9 
by municipal offices. Direct provision by municipalities was particularly common in 
sewage, in the South and in small centres.  
Prices were determined locally, with little national co-ordination or compelling 
national guidelines. Traditionally, water prices have been extremely low, with a strong 
tendency  to  consider  water  as  a  necessary  service  that  should  have  been  provided 
independently of market logic and even disregarding the financial equilibrium of service 
providers, who have been heavily subsidised. In this set-up, the linkage between the 
“regulator” (the local authority) the supplier (many times, the local authority itself) has 
traditionally been extremely strong.  
The Italian water and wastewater services system was profoundly reformed by 
Law 36/1994 (the Galli Law) to give water companies better incentives for efficient 
production and pricing. This law intervened on an extremely fragmented sector, where 
thousands of small operators served extremely small portions of the country. Very often, 
in the same area different operators would intervene in different stages of the water 
cycle (from abduction to purification and disposal). In this perspective, the key elements 
of the reforming law are as follows: 
-  the functional integration of the various activities of the water cycle within a 
water  system  zone  ("integrated  water  service":  all those  services  dealing  with 
supplying water - fetching, transporting and distributing - for domestic use and 
with the collection and treatment of wastewater); 
-  the  territorial  integration,  through  the  definition  of  Optimal  Territorial  Basins 
(ATO - Ambiti territoriali ottimali - i.e. users' basins of relevant size aiming to the 
exploitation of economies of scale and scope) where a single operator should 
manage  the  whole  integrated  water  service  under  the  supervision  of  a  Basin 
Authority (AATO), which acts as local regulator; 
-  the  sharp  distinction  between  the  planning  and  control  function  and  the 
management functions in the perspective to promote the entry of private operators 
in providing the service (aiming at reaching competition for the market); 
-  the creation of a central supervising body (Comitato per la vigilanza sull'uso delle 
risorse  idriche),  which  operates  within  the  Ministry  of  the  Environment,  and 
which only exerts the surveillance over the sector. In particular, notice that prices 
are not determined by this body, but have to follow a general rule dictated by the 
law, and implemented by each AATO.  
This  national  act,  to  be  completed  by  regional  legislation,  was  slowly 
implemented until the late 2000; then, it has recorded a significant acceleration mainly 
determined by other legislative actions and judicial decisions
7. 
By  June  2003,  out  of  91  ATO  envisaged  by  the  law  of  1994,    84,  with  a 
population of 54 million inhabitants – 94% of the total Italian population – have an 
operative ATO Authority. 
Each  ATO  Authority,  which  represents  the  interest  of  the  municipalities  and 
provinces within the basin, has responsibility for: technical and economic analysis of 
the local water and wastewater systems; selecting the relevant operator in the ATO 
(concessionaire); long-term planning for the long term sector within the ATO, by means 
of a Master Plan (Piano d'Ambito) including the investment programme to be agreed 
with  the  concessionaire;  supervising  the  concessionaire's  performance  vis-à-vis  the 
                                                 
7 For a discussion see OECD (2001),  p.119-121, downloadable from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/1/33691325.pdf    10 
Master  Plan;  ensuring  the  operation  of  the  tariff  system  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions of the Galli Law. 
The  Master  Plan  is  discussed  and  agreed  by  the  ATO  authority  and  the 
concessionaire and plays a fundamental role in the organization and management of the 
integrated water system: starting from the analysis of the existing local infrastructure 
and production capacity, the Plan sets out service standards, investment needed to match 
those standards, the concessionaire's operating cost in managing the integrated water 
services, as well as the ongoing evolution of the ATO's tariffs. 
The  regulation  of  water  tariff  which  belongs  to  the  Law  36/1994  allows  the 
concessionaire to generate a level of annual revenues that grants an adequate coverage 
of cost of capital and return on investments and is dynamically adjusted with a price-cap 
mechanism that limits annual increases in the ATO average tariff. In particular, the 
tariff  scheme  incorporates  operating  costs  (net  of a  0.5-2%  annual  efficiency  gain), 
depreciation of assets and investments at the maximum rates by law, and 7% return on 
investments. The tariff adopted by the concessionaire has to be approved by the ATO 
Authority,  which  makes  a  decision  on  the  basis  of  a  benchmarking  analysis  of  the 
variable costs of the company
8.  
The new tariff applies the "full cost recovery principle ", i.e the consumer's tariff 
will  reflect  the  full  cost  of  service.  This  principle,  along  with  the  high  investment  
planned for the whole integrated water service
9, will determine an increase in tariffs, 
which could be relevant for consumers. Given the greater market orientation of the 
sector, cross subsidies - which were widespread in past management by municipalities - 
can no longer be allowed: this, in turn, partially may compensate consumers by saving 
in terms of municipal costs (i.e.: less local taxes or increased supply of other public 
utility services), but calls for investigation on distributive effects. 
 
3.2   Energy 
3.2.1  Natural gas 
The main feature of the Italian market for natural gas is the presence of a strong 
dominant firm (Eni). This situation was only partially due to legislative decisions, and 
in principle – at least since 1996 – some competition was allowed even upstream. Prices 
were determined by a governmental body (CIPE), until the independent regulator in 
charge of both electricity and gas (AEEG) was created in 1995.  
The  Italian  liberalisation  plan  (Letta  Decree,  law  164/00,  following  the  EU 
Directive 98/30/CE) was approved in August 2000. At that moment, the gas market was 
still dominated by Eni: 90% of national production and of imports; almost 100% of long 
distance transport capacity and storage facilities, 73% of primary distribution to large 
industrial  clients  and  67%  of  that  to  thermoelectric  generators,  33%  of  secondary 
distribution. Despite being in the stock market since 1995, Eni is still controlled by the 
                                                 
8 The typical tariff used by the Italian water companies is a two part tariff, with a fix and a variable 
component.  The  benchmark  analysis  –  which  is  carried  out  following  the  so  called  “Metodo 
Normalizzato“ -  determines reference for firm’s performance only with respect to the variable part of the 
tariff. 
9 A recent forecast of investments by the Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (2004, 
p.2) for the integrated system for water service is about 51 billion euro, where about 28 billion euro are in 
the sewage and treatment segments (Co.Vi.Ri 2004, Rapporto Annuale sui Piani d'Ambito).   11 
Treasury with more than 30% of the shares. The main elements of the Letta Decree are 
the following. 
 
a)  The unbundling principle has been implemented only through legal separation of 
the  different  activities  within  the  Eni  group.  This  has  left  unchallenged  the 
dominance of Eni into the Italian market.  
b)  Third Party Access is introduced with regulated tariffs defined by the regulator; 
transport  capacity  requests  by  operators  burdened  with  take-or-pay  obligations 
must be given precedence in defining the access order.  
c)  Antitrust ceilings are introduced in the interim period of liberalisation: no operator 
can enter more than 75% of gas into the national transport network; this threshold 
will be reduced by 2% each year until 2010, with a final market share of 61%. 
Moreover, from January 2003 to December 2010 no firm will be permitted to sell 
more than 50% of gas to final customers.  
d)  Since January 2003 all customers are eligible, with complete demand opening. 
e)  The tariffs for franchise customers and for the transport, distribution and storage 
activities  are  set  by  the  regulatory  authority  (Aeeg)  according  to  a  non 
discriminatory  and  cost  reflective  standard.  The  Authority  implements  its 
intervention within the general lines of the energy policy designed each year by 
the government.   
 
Although  the  Italian  plan  introduces  some  measures to  reduce  the  role  of  the 
incumbent firm in the liberalised segments through antitrust ceilings, it did not consider 
the possibility of forcing Eni to divest part of its t.o.p. long term contracts. 
In gas, the transition towards a competitive environment is extremely slow. This is 
due to the existence of long term contracts which allow the dominant incumbent firm to 
still control the market. The partial unbundling of the Eni group, that will operate with 
different companies in all the segments of the industry, maintaining an extremely high 
market  share  all  over  the  market,  represents  the  most  pervasive  problem  in  the 
liberalisation process. Moreover, given the almost total dependence of Italy on imported 
gas, the linkage between energy policy and foreign policy makes the introduction of 
competition very slow. 
The gas distribution system is expanding slowly, but here we observe an opposite 
phenomenon  to  the  one  we  observe  upstream.  While  upstream  we  have  a  gradual 
introduction of competition, and hence a slow trend towards fragmentation of supply, in 
distribution  we  have  an  increased  consolidation,  carried  out  through  acquisitions  of 
small distributors and the gradual disappearance of cases where the local authority is the 
direct provider of the service. 
In 1997, Italy was served by 732 different distributors, 80.6% of them present 
only in one province (Italy is divided in 120 provinces), while only 4 of them were 
serving more than 10 provinces; in 2003, “only” 453 distributors operate, 74% of them 
operating only in one province. Given the expansion of the service in this period, total 
population in locations were gas is available has increased from 48,2 million to 52 
million. Therefore, while in 1997 the average gas distributor served a population of 
65.900 people, in 2003 it serves 114.800 people. It is also interesting to notice, however, 
that while the average size increases considerably, significant niches where the service 
is provided directly by the municipality still remain (about 60 cases around Italy, for a 
total population of about 450.000 units).    12 
As for the public-private balance, it is estimated that entities in public hands serve 
an increasing area of the country. While in 1997 private firms were serving about 64% 
of the population, in 2003 this percentage has decreased to about 58%; notice that this 
remains true, despite that in the “private” sector we consider Italgas, which is part of the 
Eni group, and EnelGas, both controlled by the Treasury. The apparent expansion of the 
public sector is a combination of two phenomena; on the one hand, the expansion and 
the new investments have been carried out mainly by local public utilities, and on the 
other one local public utilities have acquired some very small local private firms (Ref, 
2004).  
Although the timetable of demand opening is quite quick, only in late 2004 has 
some competition effectively started in some areas of Italy for small customers. The 
implementation of the principle of liberalisation at the local level, however, requires one 
to solve complex interactions with the reform of local public services that is still not 
completed.  Therefore,  the  Authority  still  maintains  the  control  of  prices  for  small 
customers. 
Prices are regulated with a price cap (RPI-x) since 2001, and the x factor for the 
first regulatory period has been set equal to 3%. The price formula contains elements of 
price increase which aim to compensate firms for “unpredictable” events, to reward 
them for their activities of demand control and for quality improvements. There is no 
unique national tariff (unlike in electricity). 
3.2.2  Electricity 
Until 1999 the Italian electricity market was characterised by the presence of a 
vertically integrated dominant firm, Enel, owner of 80% of generating capacity, of the 
transmission network, of most of distribution (about 93% of the final market was served 
under regulated prices by Enel). In the downstream segment some small, local public 
utilities were present, especially in large cities in the Centre – North of the country (e.g., 
Milan, Turin, Rome, Brescia). All customers before 1999 were forced to buy electricity 
from their local distributor. 
Analogously to gas, the sector was regulated directly by the Ministry until 1995, 
when an independent energy regulatory authority (Aeeg) was created, with the power to 
determine prices on the basis of a RPI-x scheme. 
The implementation of the EC Directive on electricity was given by the Bersani 
Decree (Law 79/99) in February 1999. The privatisation of Enel started in November 
1999, but the government still controls more than 30% of the company. 
The Law 79/99 envisaged a strong vertical separation between the transmission 
network – which remained under the management of a public system operator called 
Grnt – and the rest of the system
10. Access to the transmission network is open to third 
parties on the basis of conditions set by the regulatory Authority. 
                                                 
10  This  aspect  is  unfortunately  being  changed  in  2004.  The  management  and  full  control  of  the 
transmission  network  is  in  the  hands  of  an  independent  system  operator  (the  Gestore  della  rete  di 
trasmissione  nazionale,  Grtn)  which  remains  State  owned.  However,  the  ownership  of  the  network 
initially remained with Enel (a company called Terna). The unification of the network owner and the 
system operator is under way, and should be completed in October 2005. A privatisation of the unified 
TSO is envisaged, but the details of the operation are still undecided. In order to preserve the neutrality of 
the TSO, some limit (5%) to the participation of electricity firms to the control of the TSO will be 
introduced.   13 
The wholesale market was supposed to be organised as a Pool market, along the 
initial  British  example,  run  by  a  market  operator,  Gme,  owned  by  Grtn.  Bilateral 
physical  contracts  were  supposed  to  be  exceptions,  requiring  a  permission  by  the 
Authority. The market was supposed to start operating at the beginning of 2001; the 
Pool has however started its operations only in April 2004. A major reform of the initial 
framework for wholesale transactions has been introduced in 2003, whereby bilateral 
contracts have become the normal way of exchanging electricity in Italy, so that the 
electricity exchange will remain totally marginal (not more than 10% of transactions are 
expected to take place through this market)
11.  
In order to reduce Enel’s market power upstream, no firm is allowed to own more 
than 50% of total installed power or to sell more than 50% of total energy, including 
imports. To this end, Enel formed three companies which have been sold in public 
auctions. The buyers are consortia of smaller Italian independent producers or public 
utilities, with the participation of some large foreign producers such as Endesa (Spain), 
Edf (France), Tractebel (Belgium). 
Prices are free in the wholesale segment and in the sale to “eligible” customers 
and are regulated on the basis of an RPI-x system elsewhere. Distributors selling energy 
to franchise (non eligible) customers must buy the energy for these customers through a 
Single Buyer, which is also part of the State owned Grtn group. 
The thresholds for eligibility were established in order to accelerate the process of 
market opening relative to the dates set in the Directive. Since May 2003, all clients 
consuming  at  least  0.1  GWh  per  year  are  eligible.  Eligible  clients  represent  at  the 
moment more than 70% of total energy sold in the country. This market increases quite 
rapidly,  competition  is  considerable,  with  Enel  losing  quite  rapidly  its  traditional 
dominant  position,  and  substantial  entry  is  taking  place.  Although  no  other  large 
operator is actually emerging, market fragmentation is increasing.  
Italy has always maintained the idea that the regulated price should be the same 
throughout the country (single tariff). Prices to non eligible customers are regulated by 
the energy Authority, which began its operation in 1996. Until 1999, the previous price 
system  has  been  simply  “cleaned”,  eliminating  some  subsidies  and  clarifying  the 
complex  structure  of  charges  and  surcharges.  Since  January  2000,  price  regulation 
follows a RPI-x system. The x factor has been set equal to 4% in the first regulatory 
period  (2000-2003)
12.  In  the  second  period  (2004-2007)  the  x  factor  is  no  longer 
referred directly to final prices. Its value is set at 3,5% for the price of distribution and 
2,5% for transmission  (and it only refers to the part of the price which is related to 
                                                 
11 No other Western country has taken this long to actually implement a system of this type. Two main 
reasons may probably justify this delay. The first one is that the reform has left Enel with about 50% of 
production, a dominant position which was bound to undermine the ability of competition to be effective. 
The second reason is probably that Italy depends largely (16% of total consumption) on imported energy, 
coming from France, which is substantially cheaper. The initial project envisaged that this energy should 
have been exchanged in the wholesale market, so that all customers would have ended up paying the 
same price. This possibility was seen with hostility by large industrial customers, which historically have 
privileged access to imported energy. The current system confirms this privilege, and the opposition of 
large industries has thus achieved its goal 
12 In September 2002 the Italian Government decreed to block for 6 months the price dynamics decided 
by the Authority, also deciding that from that moment onwards – against what was decided in 1995 – the 
Government had the right to set principles that the Authority had to follow in deciding future price 
adjustments. 
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operational costs, and not to the total price); the dynamics of final prices will vary 
accordingly, depending on how wholesale prices and other costs evolve. 
3.3   Utility prices – regional comparisons 
Water  prices  across  Italy  display  a  substantial  variability,  as  shown  by  the 
following Figure 1 where are presented water expenditures for a standard consumption 
of  200  m
3/year  in  the  Italian  largest  seven  towns:  in  2004,  the  water  expenditure 
(Euro/m
3) in Milan is about half of that in Bari and Florence. The water marginal price – 


































Figure 3-1: Water expenditure and prices (Euro/m
3, consumption of 200 m
3/year, 2004).  Source: 
Data from local water authorities, 2004 
 These differences in water tariffs become larger when expected price dynamics are 
considered. As presented in the previous Section 3.1, the Master Plan - which is agreed 
by the local regulator authority and the water concessionaire – contains the long term 
planning  for  tariff,  reflecting  (in  application  of the  full  cost  recovery  principle)  the 
investments  needed  to  match  standards  of  service.  It  follows  that  where  large 
investments are planned, large increase in water tariffs results.  As shown in Figure 3-2 
in the period between 2004 and 2019 water tariff will record an increase of 65% in 



























Figure 3-2: Expected price dynamics.  Source: Data from local water authorities, 2004 
Something  similar  holds  for  natural  gas.  Considering  an  average  consumption  of 
1400m
3, Figure 3-3 shows that in Palermo the expenditure for natural gas is about 33% 
larger than that in Napoli. Understanding these differences is puzzling, as the natural 
gas tariff is composed by a price for gas – which is regulated by the national authority 
(AEEG), previous Section 3.2.1 - and a tax – which is locally determined. Comparing 
the local differences in both components, it appears that the tax level seems to act as a 
buffer in the total tariff level: in Figure 3-3, with the exception of Bari, taxes are lower 
where the gas price is higher, and viceversa.  
 

























Figure 3-3: Expenditure for gas average consumption (1400 m
3 ). Source: AEEG, 2004. 
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Figure 3-4 shows how the relevance of expenditure for actual average consumption 
becomes lower for towns located in the South of Italy. The black line indicates the 
actual level of comsumption in the different towns (m3, right hand axis). 
 
Expenditure for actual average consumption




































Figure 3-4: Expenditure for actual average consumption levels, 2004. Source: AEEG, 2004. 
In electricity, small customers still face a single final price for the whole country, whose 
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Figura 3-5: Average national price for electricity (Euro/100 kWh) for a consumption of 1200 
kWh/year. Source: Eurostat 
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3.4   The dynamics of utility prices for small customers 
 
How has this system performed? In different sectors we could tell different stories, 
of  course.  Water  has  the  need  to  cover  large  investments,  whose  cost  must  be 
compensated by price increases. Energy sectors could be characterised by falling prices 
because of greater efficiency, but they are obviously affected by international fuel prices 
and by the limitations to competition in the national upstream segments.  
The final outcomes are depicted in Figure 3-6, which documents the evolution of 
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Figure 3-6: Price dynamics for basic utilities and for total household consumption. Source: Istat 
 
According  to  the  national  price  index  for  water  expenditure,  water  charges 
increased by 32.9% during the period, while the total expenditure index growth was 
only 16.5%. The difference is almost completely due to two episodes: the first occurred 
in February and March 1997 with an increase of water prices of  1.4% and 2.5% over 
the  previous  month;  the  second  happened  in  January  1999,  with  a  sudden  monthly 
increase of 5.3%
13. Between these periods water prices increased at the same rate as the 
general total expenditure index.  
Electricity prices are revised bimonthly by the national Authority (AEEG), and 
did not show any variation from February to June 1997, from February to December 
1998, and from August to December 2002. The electricity index is also characterised by 
a sudden drop of 5.7% in January 1999 due to the Authority’s decision 161/98 which 
has reformed electricity prices, eliminating an extra fuel charge (component A1 of the 
final  price).  Since  1999  prices  move  following  an  RPI-x  scheme  set  by  the  energy 
authority. 
                                                 
13 This was due to the addition of VAT to the part of water price which covered sewage costs.   18 
We can easily see that energy prices for households have not increased much in 
real terms. More precisely, while real electricity prices decreased over this period, gas 
prices have moved on average in line with inflation. Prima facie, it would seem that the 
new regulation of energy sectors has produced reasonable results for final consumers, 
while the new regime on water prices – entailing a drastic reduction in subsidies and the 
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Figure 3-8: Local and national household CPI for natural gas for heating. Source: ISTAT   19 
 
3.5   Comparison between final prices and production prices 
 
In order to better understand the effectiveness of restructuring of utility sectors, it 
may  be  useful  to  compare  final  prices  with  indices  of  production  prices,  whenever 
possible, namely electricity and gas.  
Figure 3-9 shows the trend for natural gas household consumer price index in 
Italy and the gas price in the European primary market: the household Italian price  
shows  much  less  variability  than  the  price  in  the  European  primary  market.  The 
household Italian price increases substantially from 1999 to 2001, and this corresponds 
to a steep increase in the international gas price and to the beginning of the Italian 
liberalization plan. After 2002, the Italian natural gas price shows a similar trend to that 
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Figure 3-9: Natural gas household consumer prices and European primary natural gas markets 
(1997=100).  Sources: ISTAT and Eurostat 
In Figure 3-10 the Italian household consumer price for electricity is graphed along with 
the  production  cost  index  (Ct)  for  the  Italian  thermo-electric  plants.  Here,  again, 
consumer prices do not seem to absorb the changes in electricity cost of production, 
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Figure 3-10: Electricity household consumer prices and electricity cost of production using fossil fuels 
(1998=100). Sources: ISTAT and AEEG 
 
4  The data 
 
Our main data sources are the ISTAT Surveys on Family Budgets (SFB) from 
1997 to 2002. These surveys (which correspond to the British FES and the CEX in the 
US, with independent samples of about 20,000 households per year, representative of 
the Italian population) provide detailed information on expenditure and demographics, 
some information on stock of durables and housing conditions and almost unreliable 
information on income. The 2002 wave also contains data about heating efficiency and 
perceived sustainability of expenditure for utilities. All data are collected through a face 
to face interview (plus a weekly diary) during which the households are asked if the 
house  they  live  in  has  potable  water,  electricity  and  heating  (if  yes,  the  type  of 
technology  and  fuel  are  asked).  Households  should  provide  information  about  the 
amount of the latest bill for electricity and natural gas, and on the expenditure during the 
three months before the interview for water, other fuels (LPG, kerosene, diesel oil, coal 
and wood) and centralized heating. Data on ordinary and extraordinary maintenance 
works are collected for the three months prior the interview. Information on main and 
secondary home of residence are clearly separable.  
The  ISTAT  data  allow  us  to  assign  (almost)  each  household  to  its  region  of 
residence. We cannot identify more precisely the area the household lives in. This is a 
limitation  of  our  data,  because  more  detailed information  on  the  place  of  residence 
would allow us to better understand the climate the household has to cope with and the 
infrastructure endowment it can exploit: within the same region, municipalities on the 
sea  costs  have  a  different  climate  than  municipalities  on  the  mountains  (think  for 
instance to the southern regions of Calabria and Basilicata); and the natural gas network 
is much less diffused in the mountain areas.    21 
Moreover, unfortunately, ISTAT does not provide official regional price indexes; 
therefore, although we are aware that there is a not negligible regional variability for 
water and energy prices, at this stage of the work we rely on the national price indexes 
to compare expenditure amounts of different years. 
Given  that  fuel  and  water  consumption  are  strongly  correlated  with  climate 
conditions, we present many of the statistics conditional on climate regions. We identify 
four different regions according to the estimated Degrees-days index. This is defined by 
law (D.P.R. 26 agosto 1993, n. 412) as the sum over the conventional period the heating 
is on of the positive differences between 20 C
o and the external temperature, that is 
( ) ( ) t t t T T > ´ - ∑ 20 1 20  where Tt is the average external temperature for day t. ENEA 
(National Institute for Alternative Energy) provides this figure at municipality level and 
it is the official index the authorities look at to define the thermal year, i.e. in practice 
when households are allowed to switch their heating on and are supposed to switch it 
off. We compute a regional index as weighted average of municipality indexes, with 
weights given by municipality population. We therefore group the 20 administrative 
regions in four different classes: 
1.  warm  regions,  with  average  degrees-days  index  not  greater  than  1300 
(Campania, Sicily and Sardinia, 19.2% of Italian households) 
2.  tepid regions, with average degrees-days index between 1300 and 1800 (Liguria, 
Lazio, Puglia, Calabria, 21.6% of Italian households) 
3.  cool  regions,  with  average  degrees-days  index  between  1800  and  2300 
(Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Abruzzi, Molise and Basilicata, 12.9% of Italian 
households) 
4.  cold  regions,  with  average  degrees-days  index  above  2300  (Piedmont,  Valle 
d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and 
Emilia Romagna, 46.4% of Italian households) 
Notice that there is a northern region classified as “tepid” (Liguria) and southern 
regions (Molise, Abruzzi and Basilicata) classified as “cool” (Campania, a neighbouring 
region of the previous ones, is instead classified as warm).  This stresses how by using 
the region as unit of analysis we are in fact aggregating relatively warmer and colder 
areas, but this problem is inevitable, given the structure of ISTAT data, which are never 
provided at a less-than-regional basis. 
The choice of the heating technology and in general the consumption of energy 
and  water  are  strictly  related  to  the  kind  and  quality  of  the  utility  networks  the 
households  can  rely  on.  In  order  to  describe  the  infrastructural  endowments  of  the 
regions  we  use  a  set  of  indicators  provided  by  Ministry  of  Economy  and  Finance, 
Department for Development Policies (mainly estimated using the ISTAT Multiscope 
household surveys), aggregated using population weights.  
 
5  The results 
As  fuel  poverty  is  an  interaction  between  low  income,  relatively  high  fuel 
consumption  and  poor  capital  stock  (thermal  inefficient  housing  and  energy-using 
equipments) we start our analysis of the households’ welfare by providing a picture of 
the  housing  conditions  of  Italian  households.  In  Table  5-1  we  pool  together  all the 
waves of the SFB from 1997 to 2002 (changes over time are negligible if not otherwise 
stated). In the first panel we show that the infrastructural endowments of the four areas 
are quite heterogeneous, with the households in the cold, northern regions that can enjoy   22 
better natural gas, electricity and water networks. The housing stock has substantially 
different characteristics across areas: home ownership is more frequent in the northern 
regions (which might cause more extraordinary maintenance works and better walls, 
floors and frames in the same area); in the warmer regions single family houses are 
more diffused, overcrowding
14 is much more likely than in the rest of Italy, 1.8% of 
dwellings do not have indoor showers, 2.7% do not have potable water and 27.8% do 
not  have  any  heating  system.  Climate  differences  can  help  explain  part  of  this 
heterogeneity, which is also due to differences in the infrastructural endowments. But 
still, we can interpret these figures as evidence that the housing stocks of warmer and 
tepid regions are poorer than those of the cool and cold regions. That means, that  we 
can probably expect to have more energy efficient housing stocks in the cool and cold 
regions, than in the rest of Italy. 
 
Table 5-1: Infrastructural indicators and housing conditions. Averages for the 1997-2002 period. 
  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
Infrastructural indicators:           
% population connected to the natural gas network (2002)  65.4  83.7  93.9  96.8  86.6 
Average number of  interruptions in power provision   6.1  5.4  4.0  2.5  4.0 
% households claiming insufficient water services  27.1  17.4  13.6  7.4  14.3 
Average cubic meters of water monthly charged per person (1999)  5.8  6.5  5.4  6.6  6.2 
Housing conditions:            
% of households owning their house  66.9  72.1  76.1  71.4  71.3 
% of households living in  moderate-low cost accommodation  84.7  82.3  82.9  78.1  81 
% of households living in a rural house  3.6  3  5.7  4.8  4.3 
% of households living in a single family house  35.5  28.1  28  27  29.1 
Average age of the house  38.7  42.1  44  41.4  41.4 
Average number of years since moving in  21.2  20.6  21.7  20.2  20.7 
Average number of rooms (kitchen included)  4.2  4.1  4.6  4.3  4.3 
% of households in overcrowded accommodation  12.9  9.2  3.5  5.5  7.5 
% of households living without indoor WC  0.4  1.5  0.6  0.7  0.8 
% of households living without indoor shower  1.8  1.6  1  0.7  1.1 
% of households living without potable water  2.7  1.4  0.7  0.4  1.1 
% of households living without hot water  0.7  0.8  0.4  0.6  0.7 
% of households living without any heating system  27.8  7.1  1.9  1  7.6 
% of households carrying out extraordinary maintenance works in 
the 3 months before the interview 
4.2  5.8  6.3  8.0  6.6 
% of households with poor brightness room problems (2002)  13.8  10.4  7.9  6.5  8.9 
% of households with damp walls and/or floors (2002)  9.1  7.3  7.6  8.3  8.1 
% of households with rotten window frames (2002)  5.9  4.5  3.7  3.9  4.4 
Sources:  
o  Infrastructural indicators from Ministry of Economy and Finance database, except data on water 
from ISTAT (2003) 
o  Housing conditions: our computation from SFB 1997-2002 
 
The type and quantity of energy consumed by the households depend on their 
technological endowment, i.e. on the type of heating and the quantity of  household 
                                                 
14 Eurostat defines a household to live in a overcrowded accommodation if the ratio between number of 
cohabitating persons and number of available rooms is greater than one.   23 
appliances  available.  The  choice  is  dictated  by  the  combination  of  income  and 
infrastructural constraints.  
Table 5-1 
15 shows that heating is rarely left to single room-specific apparels in 
the houses of the cool and cold regions; about ¾ of centralised systems use natural gas 
and  one  half  of  them  also  produce  hot  water.  In  the  warmer  regions  the  heating 
technology is different: the use of LPG, coal, wood and electricity is widespread, and 
the electric boiler is the standard way to heat the water. Almost all households have a 
fridge and a washing machine, while other appliances are not so diffused, and this might 
cause heterogeneity in energy consumption. 
Table 5-2: Household technological endowment. Averages of the 1997-2002 period 
  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Total 
% of households heating the water with            
An electric boiler  58.1  42.5  16.8  12.8  28.4 
A gas boiler  20.9  25.7  20.2  33.9  27.9 
The heating system  20.2  31.1  61.8  51.7  42.3 
Households with some heating:           
% with:            
Centralised condominium heating  12.9  25.61  11.5  30.7  24.3 
Independent (centralised) heating system   57.3  63.9  81.7  64.3  65.5 
Single apparels (no centralized system)  29.8  10.5  6.8  5  10.1 
% using as heating fuel:           
Heating gasoil  15.1  16.3  11.8  18.4  16.5 
Natural gas  36.9  61.7  74  73.2  65.4 
Liquid Propane Gas  30.2  10  7.1  3.6  9.5 
Coal, wood and other solid fuels  8.6  8  6.3  3.7  5.7 
Electricity and others  9  3.5  0.7  0.9  2.7 
% of households with           
Electric stoves/oven  53.9  59.7  74.2  67.5  64 
Non electric stoves/oven  66.8  64.9  52  62.9  62.7 
Fridge and freezer  99  99  99  99  99 
Dishwasher machine  16.1  25.4  37.2  36.1  30.1 
Washing machine  95.2  95.7  96.2  96.7  96.1 
Vacuum cleaner  55.6  65.8  71.5  83  72.6 
Electric heaters and hoods   80.5  73.3  66.4  71.2  72.8 
Air conditioning apparels  9  6.8  5.7  11  9 
 
 
Table 5-3 provides a picture of total household expenditure
16, and expenditure for 
water, electricity, natural gas and other fuels (LPG, diesel oil, coal and wood), in 2002. 
We  always  compute  the  statistics  on  utility  expenditures  considering  only  those 
households that reported some expenditure at the interview.  
There are mainly two reasons why households may not report any expenditure for 
the utilities. The first is that not all the households use natural gas and or other fuels: 
households may choose alternative technologies or their neighbourhoods may not be 
connected to the natural gas network. In this case a zero expenditure corresponds to no 
                                                 
15 Unless otherwise indicated, from now on data come from our estimates based on Istat SFB (1997-
2002). 
16 We follow the official definition of economic consumption, and therefore we refer to total expenditure, 
net  of  any  mortgage  refunds,  life  insurance  and    private  pension  premium,  and  expenditure  for 
extraordinary maintenance works.   24 
consumption and should be considered as the household’s optimal choice, given its 
technological  endowment.  As  we  are  interested  in  short  run  effects,  we  consider 
households technological endowment as fixed, and therefore we are only interested in 
the consumption (and welfare) of those households with positive expenditure.  
The second reason why households may report no expenditure for some utility is 
related to the frequency they are billed for their consumption. In fact, for natural gas and 
electricity the amount of the last bill is asked (whenever it was paid), but for water and 
other fuels the households are asked to report the amount spent during the last 3 months. 
This implies that all those households that, for instance, pay for the water or the central 
heating twice a year may report zero expenditure.  In this case a zero expenditure does 
not imply no consumption.  
Assuming that the billing frequency is exogenous with respect to consumption, we 
can  consider  the  statistics  computed  for  the  sub-sample  of  respondent  with  positive 
expenditure  to  be  consistent  estimates  for  the  whole  sample  of  users.  Therefore,  in 
Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 all statistics refer to those households using that specific utility, 
and exclude non users. As already specified, water and electricity are used by almost 
100% of the population. For natural gas and other fuels we divide the users between 
those for which that fuel represents the main source for heating and the others (that use 
gas or other fuels only for cooking and/or as secondary heating sources). 
On average, Italian households spent € 2126.27 a month in 2002, about € 17 for 
water and the double for electricity. In 2002, the households heating their homes with 
natural gas spent € 840, those using LPG, diesel oil, coal or wood € 872. 
Table 5-3: Total monthly expenditure and monthly expenditure in utilities of the Italian 
households, 2002 averages.  
  Water  Electricity  Natural gas  Other fuels  Total 
expenditure 
       For heating   Not for 
heating  For heating   Not for 
heating   
Warm  18.98  39.55  39.74  26.46  37.09  34.30  1761.33 
Tepid  17.89  34.58  51.10  24.14  64.24  45.59  1965.17 
Cool  18.94  33.78  69.25  44.86  93.27  60.91  2203.17 
Cold  16.32  32.17  83.24  29.28  121.39  76.74  2340.77 
Italy   17.55  34.36  70.10  28.09  72.65  62.18  2126.27 
 
The  living  standards  of  the  areas  are  strongly  differentiated:  the  typical 
household living in the northern cold regions spent, on average, in 2002 32.9% more 
than the typical household living in the southern, warm part of Italy. Notice that in this 
way we compare cold, richer regions with warm poorer regions. Although they are 
richer,  households  living  in  cold  regions  spend  less  than  the  other  for  water  and 
electricity: the typical households in the warm area spend about 15% and 25% more for 
water  and  electricity  than  households  in  the  cold  area.  Notice  that  while  the  first 
difference may be due to different prices for the water, the second indicates different 
quantities of energy consumed, as the price for electricity is homogenous throughout the 
national territory. This is consistent with the fact that households of these two areas 
have different stocks of durables: in the warm areas electric water boilers and electric 
heaters are more diffused than in the cold regions. Vice-versa, as expected, northern 
households spend more for natural gas and other fuels: households using natural gas or   25 
other fuels for heating and living in the cold regions spend more than the double of 
those living in the warm or tepid areas. 
The incidence of the expenditure for utilities on the households’ budgets also 
varies across areas: the median budget share for water was 0.61% in the cold areas v. 
0.95% in the warm regions, the 3.1% or 3.8% for heating fuels in cold areas (using gas 
or other fuels respectively) compare with the 1.9% or 1.2% in warm regions. 
Table 5-4: Median shares of expenditure in utilities of the Italian households, 2002 (%) 
  Water  Electricity  Natural gas  Other fuels 
       For Heating  Not for 
heating  For Heating  Not for 
heating 
Warm  0.95  2.31  1.87  1.51  1.15  0.89 
Tepid  0.78  1.74  2.08  0.77  1.81  1.59 
Cool  0.72  1.51  2.75  1.33  3.22  2.13 
Cold  0.61  1.34  3.07  0.77  3.79  2.31 
Italy   0.72  1.59  2.61  0.95  1.79  1.99 
 
 
Part  of  the  differences  in  water  and  electricity  expenditure  between  areas  is 
somewhat reduced when we consider per capita expenditure (see Table 5-5):  in 2002 
the  individuals  in  warm  regions  spent  almost  the  same  amount  for  water  than  the 
individuals in the cold area, and only 3.7% more in electricity. Considering household 
sizes has an opposite effect when we focus on heating fuels: the average per capita 
expenditure for heating in the cold area was 2.6 to 3.8 times that in the warm area, 
depending on the type of fuel. 
Table 5-5: Average per capita monthly expenditure, 2002 
  Water  Electricity  Natural gas  Other fuels  Total 
expenditure 
       For Heating  Not for 
heating  For Heating  Not for 
heating   
Warm  6.72  13.78  13.26  10.51  12.54  10.07  613.63 
Tepid  6.51  13.05  19.33  11.43  22.00  15.94  742.07 
Cool  7.33  13.06  26.68  19.48  34.97  22.99  851.77 
Cold  6.68  13.29  34.18  12.94  47.70  28.08  966.60 
Italy   6.76  13.31  27.41  12.29  25.91  22.01  823.58 
 
Table 5-3 and Table 5-5 therefore show that although northern cold regions are 
richer  than  the  southern  warm  area,  southern  households  spend  more  in  water  and 
electricity than the northern ones: however, in per capita terms the expenditure for these 
utilities are almost equal across areas. For water this does not imply that individuals 
consume almost the same quantity of water in different part of Italy, as we know that 
prices are quite different (higher in the South) and that ISTAT estimates per capita 
consumption of water are larger in the cold areas than in warm ones (see Table 5-1 and 
ISTAT 2003).    26 
5.1   The 1997-2002 period 
 
Over the period covered by our analysis three relevant changes can be observed.  
First of all, a greater diffusion of natural gas; between 1997 and 2002, the number 
of households served by natural gas networks increased
17 by 33% in Calabria, 21% in 
Molise and Sicily, 18% in Puglia, 16% in Basilicata, 14% in Campania and 12% in 
Trentino – Alto Adige. We currently have about 52 out of 57 million of the Italian 
population served by the gas network.  
Second,  among  those  served  by  natural  gas,  several households  changed  their 
heating systems from other fuels to natural gas: overall, the percentage of households 
using heating gasoil to heat their homes fell from 18.5% in 1997 to 9.6 in 2002, while 
the fraction of households using natural gas for heating increased from 56.7% to 67.5% 
during the same period (Table 5-6).  
 
Table 5-6: Percentage of households using diesel oil or natural gas as main fuel to heat their homes  




Gas  Heating 
gasoil 
Gas  Heating 
gasoil 
Gas  Heating 
gasoil 
Gas  Heating 
gasoil 
Gas 
1997  12.9  22.8  19.6  53.6  13.4  71.0  21.7  68.1  18.5  56.7 
1998  13.3  25.0  15.9  56.9  14.0  68.9  20.0  69.7  17.1  58.2 
1999  13.3  19.6  17.9  50.5  13.1  71.9  20.3  69.2  17.5  56.0 
2000  9.9  30.7  15.0  56.6  10.2  74.8  17.2  72.8  14.5  61.6 
2001  9.6  28.2  13.5  59.6  11.9  70.4  17.8  73.7  14.6  61.6 
2002  6.4  32.7  9.1  65.9  7.3  78.0  12.0  80.2  9.6  67.5 
 
Third, the composition and the size of the stock of electricity consuming apparels 
owned by the households changed over time (Table 5-7). The number of families using 
air conditioning more than doubled, going from 6% of the households in 1997 to 13.1% 
in 2002 (from 4.5% to 15.1% in the warm area). At the same time the percentage of 
families with an electric boiler reduced form 31.5% to 23.9% (from 64.4% to 51% in 
the warm area). 
 
Table 5-7: Percentage of households owning an air conditioner (A/C) and an electric boiler (%) 
  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
  A/C  Boiler  A/C  Boiler  A/C  Boiler  A/C  Boiler  A/C  Boiler 
1997  4.5  64.4  4.5  46.6  4.0  18.5  7.8  14.5  6.0  31.5 
1998  6.6  58.2  5.7  44.6  4.9  19.0  8.2  13.7  6.9  29.6 
1999  7.3  63.8  5.4  49.6  5.9  16.4  9.6  12.6  7.8  30.8 
2000  9.4  54.1  7.4  42.0  5.4  16.1  11.3  13.1  9.4  27.5 
2001  11.1  54.5  8.3  36.3  5.9  15.8  13.4  12.3  10.9  25.8 
2002  15.1  51.0  9.3  33.8  7.9  14.9  15.8  10.1  13.1  23.9 
 
These changes in infrastructural endowments and the technologies adopted by the 
households  should  be  taken  into  account  when  we  consider  the  evolution  of  utility 
expenditure over the period 1997 – 2002 (Table 7-1 and Table 7-2 in Appendix). While 
                                                 
17 Data from Ref. (2004).   27 
in every year of this period Italian national income has increased, Italian households 
increased their total expenditure in the first four years, while in 2001 and 2002 they 
experienced a marked reduction in real terms expenditure, in particular in the warm and 
cold regions.   
Given this situation, we now want to analyse households’ expenditure both in 
current and in constant 1995 prices. To this end, we deflate expenditure in utilities with 
the commodity specific consumer price index
18. We use national price indices because 
the Central Statistical Office (ISTAT) does not release any regional commodity specific 
price index. If the price dynamics of the single areas were remarkably different from the 
national dynamics, then inter-temporal comparisons within and between areas would be 
of difficult interpretation. This is not an issue for electricity prices, whose dynamics are 
centrally determined, it could be for water, natural gas
19 and other fuels. For the time 
being, we assume that the dynamics of utility prices is homogeneous over the territory 
(we do not need to assume that the prices are the same, but only that their changes are). 
Under this assumption, the utility expenditures at 1995 prices do not provide any clear 
evidence  of  significant  changes  in  the  quantities  consumed  during  the  period 
considered, with the exception of the expenditure for electricity in the cool and cold 
regions. 
The incidence of expenditure in utilities on total household expenditure varies 
over time and with the area of residence. Large changes in relative prices can cause 
remarkable changes in the budget share if the households do not (or cannot) adjust their 
demand promptly. So, the budget share (current prices) for water went from 0.87 in 
1997 to 0.95 (+9%) in 2002 in the warm regions, and from 0.53 to 0.61 (+15%) in the 
cold area (see Table 7-3 in the Appendix). The electricity budget share (current prices) 
rose from 1.15% to 1.34% in the cold area and form 1.34% to 1.51% in the cool area, 
but this is likely to be mainly due to quantity changes (constant prices shares increased 
even more). 
5.2  Family size, “economies of scale” and poverty 
Conditioning  on  family  size is  crucial  to  understand to  what  extent  households  can 
exploit “economies of scale”. If we want to evaluate the welfare of a household on the 
basis of its expenditure, we have to take into account that a couple of individuals does 
not need to spend twice what a single spends to reach the same welfare. This is true in 
general, but in particular when we consider utilities, that are mainly devoted to the 
production of (intra-household) public goods, such as lighting and heating. In Table 7-4 
13 we compare households of different size and different area in year 2002. We start 
restricting our attention to year 2002, because differences between years are mainly due 
to differences in relative prices, not to quantity variations.  
Later on we shall discuss how variations in prices have affected the different types 
of households. If we consider total expenditure, a 4 member household in the warm 
regions spends 1.60 times what a couple spends, while in the cold regions the ratio is 
only 1.39. These ratios vary with the commodity we consider: they are between 1.3 and 
1.5 for water and electricity, between 1.15 and 1.4 for gas and other fuels (lower in 
                                                 
18 For other fuels we compute the expenditure at 1995 using the “Other liquid fuels” CPI if diesel oil or 
LPG, and the total expenditure CPI for coal and wood. 
19 Gas prices are subject to a revenue cap since 2000. However, firms are free to change their price 
structure.   28 
those regions where heating expenditure is predominant), suggesting that economies of 
consumption are stronger for gas and other fuels than for water and electricity. As a 
consequence, all the per capita expenditures in utilities (and consumption) are strictly 
decreasing with family size. 
Although there are economies of consumption, larger households consume more. 
This implies that, in a world in which almost all utilities have increasing block tariffs, 
larger households face higher marginal prices. This holds even if consumption by larger 
families may be more “efficient”, as it contributes to the welfare of a larger number of 
individuals. Consider the case of water in the cold area: a single person spends on 
average 11 Euro per month, while the per capita monthly expenditure for an individual 
in a 4 member household is less than a half (5.4 Euro). Given that they both face a price 
increasing blocks tariff, the difference in terms of quantity of water consumed is even 
more striking. But nevertheless, a single will pay his next shower less than what it will 
be paid by anyone in the 4 member household. Similar results hold for all the utilities, 
which raises a fairness and an efficiency issue for the block tariffs which do not take 
into account family size. 
The distribution of the budget shares for water, electricity, gas and other fuels are 
such that 80% of the households allocate less than 1% of their budgets to water and less 
than 3% to electricity, about 80% of natural gas users spend less than 6% for this utility, 
while the fraction of users spending more than 5% of their budget for other fuels is 
larger than 20%. In Table 7-5 and Table 7-6 we report the 2002 medians of the utilities 
budget shares. We compute these statistics by area, family size and households’ poverty 
status. 
As  already  specified,  we  define  a  household  to  be  relatively  poor  if  its  total 
expenditure falls below the relative poverty line, and we identify the absolutely poor as 
those households whose consumption falls below the absolute poverty line (see Section 
2). There is not a clear, constant relation between the  share of expenditure for utilities 
and the family size, as it depends on the different rate of growth of total expenditure and 
utility  expenditures  with  households’  size.  The  poorer  households  spend  a  larger 
fraction of their budgets for utilities: the median shares for the absolute and relative 
poor families are almost the double of those of the whole population. Given that water, 
electricity and gas are not close substitutes in the short run (i.e. given the technological 
endowment  of  the  households),  we  can  estimate  the  median  incidence  of  the  three 
utilities together to be the sum of the median incidence of the single utilities: taking 
water, electricity and gas together the absolutely poor households spent about 9.7% of 
their  budget  for  these  utilities  in  the  cold  regions  and  9.1%  in  the  warm  region, 
compared to 4.75% and 5.06% for the whole population in the same areas. 
 
5.3   The affordability issue 
 
In Section 2 we presented the main indicators adopted to study the affordability of 
utilities and we suggested new indices suitable for the Italian case. We now provide a 
first  attempt  to  operationally  define  and  estimate  the  minimum  socially  acceptable 




h q q p .  This  amount  is  the  same  one  used  by  the  Italian  Poverty 
Commission as component of the reference basket for the absolute poverty line. For 




h q q p   to  be  equal  to  the  25
th  percentile  of  households   29 
expenditure for natural gas for those households with single apparels or an independent 
(centralised) heating system. Given that they refer to a socially acceptable minimum 
expenditure, we need to bear in mind that what is socially acceptable in a warm region  
not be acceptable in a cold area, simply because of differences in external temperatures. 
Technically, using an expenditure distribution not conditional on the area of residence 
of the households may be misleading because the fraction of households using natural 
gas to heat their homes is not homogeneous across the national territory (see previous 
Table 5-3), because a remarkable percentage of southern households do not heat their 
home,  and  because  households  in  the  cold  area  spend  much  more  for  heating  than 
families in the warm (southern) regions (see Table 7-1 - Table 7-4 in the Appendix).  
 
Table 5-8: 1997 Poverty Commission's estimates of the heating and electricity components of the 
absolute poverty line. Updated to 2002 values using commodity specific consumer price indexes.  
  Minimum monthly family expenditure 
  Heating  Electricity 
# of members  Euro  % of absolute poverty line  Euro  % of absolute poverty line 
1  18.9  4.98  9.6  2.53 
2  23.7  4.17  12.9  2.26 
3  28.3  3.49  17.3  2.13 
4  29.0  2.82  21.7  2.11 
5  31.1  2.40  27.2  2.10 
6 or more  34.0  2.0-2.7  29.6  1.8-1.9 
 Source: Poverty Commission, ISTAT (2004) 
If we compare the shares for gas, other fuels and electricity for the poor households in 
Table 7-5 in Appendix -  with the shares reported in Table 5-8 above, we see that 
following the criterion of the Poverty commission the incidence of heating for poor 
families in the cold areas is badly underestimated, while the same ratio is overestimated 
for the poor households in the warm regions. A similar result holds for electricity. This 
is the consequence of adopting a unique national threshold in a context where territorial 
differences are strong and also driven by climatic heterogeneity. In what follows, we 
therefore adopt a different threshold: we define the minimum amount necessary for 
having a decent heating as the 25
th percentile of the 1997 distribution of the expenditure 
for gas and other fuels for those households having a heating system, conditional on 
family and area of residence. 
Table 5-9: 25
th percentile of water, electricity, gas and other fuels expenditure, by family size and 
area, 1997, Euro 
 
  Water  Electricity  Heating (Gas and other fuels) 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold 
1  5.34  5.16  5.16  3.62  12.14  10.33  9.04  7.75  7.40  8.52  17.22  11.10 
2  6.03  6.03  6.20  5.16  16.27  12.91  12.65  10.85  9.04  12.14  22.90  18.06 
3  8.61  6.89  7.23  6.89  20.66  16.78  15.49  15.49  11.19  13.77  28.41  22.08 
4  8.61  8.61  8.61  8.26  22.21  20.66  18.59  19.37  12.74  15.49  30.99  25.82 
5 or more  10.33  9.12  8.95  8.61  28.41  24.53  21.95  25.82  12.91  18.85  35.29  22.38   30 
With this definition, the amount considered to be socially acceptable for heating in 
the  cold  area  is  twice  the  corresponding  amount  for  the  warm  area.  To  obtain  the 
threshold shares with respect to which we define a household to be in fuel poverty, we 
need  to  compute  the  ratio  between  the  amounts  in  Table  5-9  and  total  family 




h E q q p / ) and to take its average for those households falling in the 
left tail of the distribution of the equivalent total family expenditure for the area of 
residence. With the same rationale we can estimate the minimum socially acceptable 
expenditure and the threshold budget shares also for water and electricity.  
We report our estimates in Table 5-10, which can be read as follows: a family 
living in the cold area is in fuel poverty if the ratio between its expenditure for fuels in 
Table 5-9 and its total expenditure is above 2.06%. 
 
Table 5-10:Threshold budget shares for water, fuel and electricity poverty 
  Threshold budget  shares (%) 
Area  Water  Electricity  Heating 
Warm  1.19  2.97  1.66 
Tepid  0.93  2.07  1.72 
Cool  0.88  1.77  3.19 
Cold  0.64  1.42  2.06 
 
According  to  this  measure,  in  1997  about  9%  of  the  households  were  in  water, 
electricity and fuel poverty according to our definition (see Table 7-7 ): overall there 
were about 2.4 million households (10.6% of the households; 5.3 million individuals, 
9.2% of the population) facing an affordability problem with at least one of the utility 
considered, 500,000 living in the warm regions, 1,000,000 in the cold ones (see Table 
7-9)
20. As we discussed in Section 2, affordability is a combination of poor income, 
poor  housing  conditions  and  inefficiency;  so  it  is  not  surprising  that  families  with 
affordability problems are more frequent among smaller households even though these 
households are not those more likely to be relatively poor.  
It  can  now  be  useful  to  compare  our  results  with  the  picture  resulting  if  one 
applied the affordability threshold of 3% for the water budget shares, used among others 
by  OECD  (2003)  and  Peruzzi  (2003),  which  assume  that  a  household  has  a  water 










To fix a 3% threshold is equivalent to say that in Italy water affordability is an 
issue for the warm regions where 8.9% of household spend more than 3% of their 
budget for water in 2003 (see Table 7-8). Things do change remarkably, in particular for 
the cold regions, if we say that there is an affordability issue when the households need 
to spend more than a given share to buy a quantity of water that is considered socially 
                                                 
20 In the UK there were 5.5 million households in fuel poverty in 2001, DEFRA (2001).   31 
acceptable to avoid social exclusion: the fraction of household with water affordability 
problem rises from 2.94% to 9.96% using the 3% threshold. 
 
 
5.4  The affordability over time 
Considering the 1997’s reference basket, as defined in the previous Section 5.3, in 
what  follows  we  update  its  value  using  the  current  national  price  index;  we  then 
determine the percentage of families which results over the threshold level defined in 
Table 5-10.  In Figure 5.1, the household with affordability problems in heating, water 
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Figure 5-1: Households with affordability problems in heating, water and electricity.  
 
 
Referring to water sector and looking at the future, Italy will probably join the group of 
countries whose officials perceive an affordability problem, but at the same time will 
abandon  the  measure  and  the  structures  directly  applied  to  water  bills.  In  fact,  the 
ongoing reform of water sector provides substantial incentives for new infrastructural 
investments (which will need to be paid off), abolished the “minimo garantito” (i.e. a 
subsidized  minimum  quantity),  and  included  sanitation  and  sewerage  cost  as  a 
component of the water tariff. 
In Figure 5-2 the relationship between the affordability index as computed for each 
utility and its relative price is showed. For all utilities, the affordability index – the star 
line – moves together with that utility’s relative price. It is only in 2003 that the two 
indices move differently, because for that year the higher utility prices are more than 






































































































































Figure 5-2: Affordability indexes for water, heating and electricity and utility relative prices over 
time.   33 
Comparing now the 2003 affordability levels in heating, water and electricity for 
the different Italian regions with those recorded in 1997 (see Table 7-7 and Table 7-8), 
we find that the largest increase refers to water in the tepid region; while the largest 
decrease to electricity in cool regions. 
Furthermore, households with one or two members are those who witnessed the 
largest  reduction  of  the  affordability  indices  for  electricity  and  heating,  while 
households with more than 3 members are those who suffered most the increase in 
water prices (again, see Table 7-7 and Table 7-8). This is due the fact that the relative 
weights of fixed and variable costs for households change with the family size, and that 
the reforms have affected the utility tariffs differently with respect to this. 
 
Can we say that the liberalisation process has  made the  affordability problem 
worse? For these sectors, the answer so far seems to be negative. Although the evidence 
is  still  preliminary  and  no  clear  trend  can  be  shown,  the  share  of  households  with 
problems for at least one utility does not increase, and possibly decreases.  
Indeed, if one looks at price dynamics, one sees that gas and electricity prices 
have moved in line with inflation; despite the increase in oil prices; so far the energy 
regulator has been able to protect Italian customers.  On the other hand, water prices 
exploded  between  1997  and  2003  (+33%  in  nominal  terms,  about  15  points  above 
inflation), and this may get even worse soon, given the relevant investments envisaged 
in the water sector in the near future. However, as electricity and gas have a larger share 
of expenditure than water, on average the percentage of households with affordability 
problems appears to be on the decrease. 
6  Extensions 
 
In the present analysis we have shown that reforms in the Italian utility markets 
have not exacerbated the affordability issue. However, the picture changes depending 
on the definition adopted (Section 2). We have provided a preliminary estimate of the 
minimum socially acceptable expenditure in utilities – gas, electricity and water - as it is 
used by the Italian Poverty Commission for the reference basket in the definition of the 
absolute poverty line.  
However, unlike the Italian Poverty Commission, the present analysis has used a 
threshold which is conditional on family and area of residence; that is, we have defined 
the minimum amount necessary for having a decent heating to be the 25
th percentile of 
the 1997 distribution of the expenditure for gas and other fuels for those households 
having  a  heating  system,  conditional  on  family  and  area  of  residence.  The  same 
reasoning  is  then  applied  to  thresholds  for  water  and  electricity.  Our  results  have 
highlighted how climatic regions and family size are relevant in the estimate of the 
percentage of households with affordability issue.  
In  1997  there  were  overall  about  2.4  million  households  (10.6%  of  the 
households;  5.3  million  individuals,  9.2%  of  the  population)  facing  an  affordability 
problem with at least one of the utility considered, 500,000 living in the warm regions, 
1,000,000 in the cold ones. In 2003 the situation is not terribly different, which indicates 
that utility reforms so far have not harmed weaker households. 
Referring the affordability measure to the number of family components, we have 
observed – as it can be expected – that: a) fixed costs determine a decrease in the   34 
affordability measure for family with less than three members (i.e.: scale economies in 
consumption); b) the number of components is particularly relevant for electricity (i.e.: 
above 3 components the affordability measure rapidly increases). 
The analysis we have presented in this paper is still preliminary. To have a clearer 
understanding of how utility reforms had an impact on households one should probably 
have a clearer notion of how average prices vary across Italian regions, an information 
which appears difficult to obtain, especially for water and gas. 
Among the possible extensions that we can anticipate, an analysis of the effects of 
future price reforms on households’ welfare would be particularly interesting. If one can 
forecast that in the near future some utility prices will have to increase, the issue of how 
to design tariffs in order – for instance – to minimise negative consequences on poorer 
households – given the revenue constraint – becomes particularly relevant.   35 
7  Appendix  
Table 7-1: Average household monthly expenditure, by year and area 
  Total Expenditure 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  1564.43  1840.70  1894.02  2203.87  1963.49  1474.17  1734.30  1784.54  2076.67  1850.12 
1998  1687.27  1893.96  1960.93  2213.99  2011.46  1559.27  1750.18  1811.90  2045.85  1858.72 
1999  1681.54  1792.88  2068.26  2256.96  2022.99  1528.71  1629.75  1880.26  2051.75  1839.04 
2000  1746.16  1877.84  2074.84  2374.50  2110.74  1548.08  1664.63  1839.67  2105.16  1871.30 
2001  1716.73  1814.41  2113.80  2369.80  2094.88  1480.71  1565.09  1823.39  2044.21  1807.03 
2002  1761.33  1965.17  2203.17  2340.77  2126.27  1482.53  1654.16  1854.29  1970.20  1789.68 
  Water 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  15.67  15.04  13.96  13.49  14.27  12.69  12.17  11.29  10.91  11.54 
1998  15.28  15.92  16.79  14.54  15.25  11.99  12.49  13.17  11.41  11.97 
1999  17.05  17.77  16.51  16.27  16.74  12.31  12.85  11.92  11.76  12.10 
2000  16.87  19.34  16.74  15.96  16.88  11.81  13.52  11.71  11.17  11.81 
2001  18.58  20.51  19.17  15.43  17.54  12.71  14.04  13.12  10.56  12.01 
2002  18.98  17.89  18.94  16.32  17.55  12.72  12.00  12.70  10.95  11.77 
  Electricity 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  37.12  31.96  26.90  28.39  30.64  39.85  34.31  28.88  30.47  32.89 
1998  36.76  32.26  29.01  29.36  31.37  38.81  34.07  30.63  31.00  33.12 
1999  39.51  31.12  29.25  29.13  31.56  43.53  34.30  32.25  32.11  34.79 
2000  36.98  31.02  29.07  29.77  31.32  37.69  31.58  29.61  30.30  31.89 
2001  37.99  31.48  31.09  32.56  33.17  37.48  31.06  30.65  32.12  32.72 
2002  39.55  34.58  33.78  32.17  34.36  39.63  34.65  33.84  32.23  34.42 
  Gas 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  34.50  42.47  59.39  67.06  57.79  31.18  38.36  53.64  60.59  52.21 
1998  33.14  43.78  60.73  72.24  60.79  30.22  39.93  55.43  65.93  55.47 
1999  36.36  44.47  68.61  70.40  62.23  34.02  41.57  64.16  65.84  58.19 
2000  37.64  44.33  65.54  74.79  63.43  31.94  37.65  55.71  63.57  53.91 
2001  37.01  42.38  62.56  73.00  61.49  29.00  33.14  48.94  57.04  48.07 
2002  36.80  47.82  68.33  79.02  66.02  30.34  39.33  56.26  65.01  54.33 
  Other Fuels 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  26.57  48.57  71.99  89.64  55.51  24.72  45.14  66.92  83.31  51.60 
1998  31.11  49.45  79.30  92.60  58.24  29.39  46.79  74.85  87.67  55.08 
1999  27.45  54.34  73.56  104.03  59.71  25.34  50.08  67.44  95.82  54.99 
2000  30.49  53.57  81.30  99.30  60.90  24.82  43.84  66.93  80.48  49.60 
2001  29.08  55.43  86.57  105.79  62.91  23.78  45.75  71.54  86.40  51.60 
2002  29.65  56.50  82.41  106.13  61.71  24.22  46.44  67.49  86.68  50.49   36 
 
Table 7-2: Average per capita monthly expenditure, by year and area 
  Total Expenditure 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  538.55  692.30  736.80  854.51  738.82  507.48  652.28  694.21  805.20  696.16 
1998  583.14  718.11  773.95  864.25  762.33  538.91  663.59  715.13  798.61  704.45 
1999  587.11  683.72  814.57  884.70  770.72  533.75  621.51  740.53  804.26  700.64 
2000  613.27  719.40  821.03  940.15  810.23  543.70  637.72  727.98  833.51  718.32 
2001  607.79  698.21  840.93  946.16  809.96  524.23  602.27  725.39  816.17  698.67 
2002  613.63  742.07  851.77  966.60  823.58  516.50  624.63  716.88  813.58  693.20 
  Water 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  5.41  5.68  5.39  5.20  5.37  4.38  4.59  4.36  4.21  4.34 
1998  5.35  6.14  6.62  5.62  5.80  4.20  4.82  5.19  4.41  4.55 
1999  6.03  6.97  6.51  6.35  6.43  4.36  5.04  4.70  4.59  4.65 
2000  6.00  7.18  6.66  6.24  6.43  4.20  5.02  4.66  4.36  4.50 
2001  6.57  7.46  7.55  6.13  6.69  4.50  5.11  5.17  4.19  4.58 
2002  6.72  6.51  7.33  6.68  6.76  4.51  4.37  4.92  4.48  4.53 
  Electricity 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  12.77  12.01  10.47  11.01  11.53  13.71  12.89  11.23  11.82  12.37 
1998  12.70  12.23  11.45  11.46  11.89  13.41  12.91  12.09  12.10  12.55 
1999  13.80  11.87  11.52  11.42  12.02  15.21  13.08  12.70  12.59  13.25 
2000  12.98  11.88  11.50  11.78  12.02  13.23  12.09  11.72  11.99  12.24 
2001  13.44  12.12  12.37  13.00  12.82  13.26  11.95  12.19  12.82  12.65 
2002  13.78  13.05  13.06  13.29  13.31  13.81  13.08  13.08  13.31  13.33 
  Gas 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  11.70  16.28  23.41  26.59  22.38  10.57  14.70  21.14  24.02  20.22 
1998  11.15  16.90  23.70  28.63  23.51  10.16  15.41  21.64  26.13  21.45 
1999  12.08  17.23  26.98  28.16  24.26  11.30  16.11  25.23  26.34  22.69 
2000  13.11  17.35  26.07  30.06  24.91  11.12  14.73  22.16  25.55  21.17 
2001  12.40  16.73  24.99  29.66  24.26  9.72  13.08  19.55  23.18  18.96 
2002  12.73  18.54  26.44  32.63  26.08  10.49  15.25  21.77  26.84  21.46 
  Other fuels 
  Current prices  Constant prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  8.96  17.43  27.17  31.77  19.49  8.33  16.20  25.25  29.53  18.11 
1998  10.73  17.70  31.43  33.17  20.77  10.14  16.74  29.67  31.41  19.64 
1999  9.62  19.95  28.03  37.21  21.45  8.88  18.39  25.70  34.27  19.76 
2000  10.67  19.34  31.03  35.55  21.80  8.69  15.83  25.54  28.81  17.75 
2001  10.44  19.82  34.09  38.15  22.83  8.54  16.36  28.17  31.16  18.73 
2002  10.05  19.81  31.23  40.96  22.05  8.21  16.29  25.57  33.45  18.04 
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Table 7-3: Median households’ utility budget shares, by year (%) 
  Water 
  Current Prices  Constant Prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  0.87  0.66  0.64  0.53  0.62  0.75  0.57  0.55  0.45  0.54 
1998  0.87  0.64  0.72  0.55  0.65  0.74  0.55  0.62  0.47  0.55 
1999  0.91  0.78  0.68  0.60  0.69  0.72  0.62  0.54  0.48  0.55 
2000  0.89  0.80  0.75  0.58  0.69  0.71  0.63  0.59  0.46  0.55 
2001  0.99  0.90  0.76  0.56  0.71  0.78  0.71  0.60  0.44  0.56 
2002  0.95  0.78  0.72  0.61  0.72  0.75  0.62  0.58  0.49  0.57 
  Electricity 
  Current Prices  Constant Prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  2.41  1.67  1.34  1.15  1.46  2.75  1.90  1.53  1.31  1.67 
1998  2.19  1.56  1.38  1.16  1.42  2.51  1.78  1.58  1.33  1.63 
1999  2.43  1.69  1.37  1.15  1.45  2.94  2.04  1.66  1.40  1.75 
2000  2.20  1.69  1.34  1.16  1.44  2.52  1.92  1.53  1.34  1.65 
2001  2.28  1.73  1.45  1.28  1.54  2.61  1.98  1.65  1.46  1.76 
2002  2.31  1.74  1.51  1.34  1.59  2.76  2.07  1.80  1.60  1.89 
  Gas 
  Current Prices  Constant Prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  1.75  1.92  2.92  2.45  2.30  1.69  1.84  2.80  2.35  2.20 
1998  1.68  1.94  2.68  2.73  2.38  1.67  1.91  2.68  2.72  2.35 
1999  1.64  2.01  2.97  2.65  2.42  1.69  2.05  3.05  2.73  2.49 
2000  1.72  1.87  2.79  2.63  2.33  1.63  1.76  2.62  2.48  2.21 
2001  1.81  1.93  2.60  2.67  2.35  1.64  1.77  2.37  2.43  2.14 
2002  1.80  1.89  2.70  2.81  2.39  1.77  1.86  2.65  2.75  2.34 
  Other Fuels 
  Current Prices  Constant Prices (1995=100) 
   Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1997  0.94  1.59  2.72  2.51  1.34  0.93  1.58  2.71  2.48  1.33 
1998  0.94  1.38  3.15  2.55  1.35  0.98  1.42  3.18  2.59  1.40 
1999  0.94  1.68  2.67  2.34  1.33  0.94  1.69  2.65  2.36  1.34 
2000  1.03  1.53  2.77  2.54  1.45  0.91  1.40  2.57  2.37  1.32 
2001  0.99  1.77  3.45  2.58  1.49  0.93  1.69  3.29  2.51  1.40 
2002  1.00  1.69  2.84  3.15  1.51  0.96  1.64  2.75  3.04  1.46 
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Table 7-4: Average family and per capita monthly expenditure, by family size and area, 2002. 
  Total Expenditure 
  Household  Per Capita 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  991.84  1282.71  1337.16  1459.16  1325.77  991.84  1282.71  1337.16  1459.16  1325.77 
2  1434.71  1776.13  1877.75  2238.24  1962.38  717.35  888.07  938.88  1119.12  981.19 
3  1936.31  2254.23  2613.65  2797.54  2510.60  645.44  751.41  871.22  932.51  836.87 
4  2305.41  2505.00  2939.86  3113.04  2740.45  576.35  626.25  734.96  778.26  685.11 
5 or more  2339.30  2493.34  3172.04  3238.58  2730.07  440.14  475.47  597.81  620.65  518.08 
  Water 
  Household  Per Capita 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  13.47  12.59  13.03  11.06  12.06  13.47  12.59  13.03  11.06  12.06 
2  16.68  15.66  18.05  14.74  15.80  8.34  7.83  9.02  7.37  7.90 
3  20.03  18.98  20.05  18.77  19.23  6.68  6.33  6.68  6.26  6.41 
4  22.61  21.82  23.78  21.63  22.22  5.65  5.45  5.94  5.41  5.55 
5 or more  25.14  24.05  26.23  25.10  25.01  4.66  4.61  4.91  4.85  4.74 
  Electricity 
  Household  Per Capita 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  27.08  24.39  22.17  20.04  22.47  27.08  24.39  22.17  20.04  22.47 
2  34.88  31.80  28.76  29.71  30.80  17.44  15.90  14.38  14.85  15.40 
3  43.26  37.28  38.21  37.93  38.75  14.42  12.43  12.74  12.64  12.92 
4  45.23  42.42  44.58  43.83  43.92  11.31  10.60  11.15  10.96  10.98 
5 or more  53.10  47.10  50.80  50.82  50.64  9.99  8.98  9.57  9.74  9.61 
  Gas 
  Household  Per Capita 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  26.13  36.78  48.75  63.04  51.74  26.13  36.78  48.75  63.04  51.74 
2  32.46  46.81  67.01  79.11  66.95  16.23  23.41  33.51  39.56  33.47 
3  38.77  53.40  75.75  83.90  72.35  12.92  17.80  25.25  27.97  24.12 
4  44.87  55.63  79.23  92.16  74.12  11.22  13.91  19.81  23.04  18.53 
5 or more  42.12  53.70  84.25  102.26  72.93  7.98  10.34  16.05  19.69  13.97 
  Other Fuels 
  Household  Per Capita 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  17.12  29.63  57.72  80.54  44.83  17.12  29.63  57.72  80.54  44.83 
2  23.65  55.46  78.85  111.36  61.43  11.83  27.73  39.43  55.68  30.71 
3  31.53  54.35  87.02  111.29  65.31  10.51  18.12  29.01  37.10  21.77 
4  36.56  72.06  98.01  130.62  72.20  9.14  18.02  24.50  32.66  18.05 
5 or more  41.89  79.61  116.85  101.79  68.11  7.89  15.01  21.59  19.32  12.83 
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Table 7-5: Median utility share expenditure (%), by family size,  area and poverty status, 2002. 
  Water 
  All  Relatively poor  Absolutely Poor 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  1.09  0.88  0.76  0.70  0.81  2.00  2.10  2.53  1.61  1.90  2.07  2.53  3.07  1.86  2.23 
2  1.03  0.76  0.77  0.59  0.72  1.63  1.64  2.23  1.44  1.66  1.87  1.95  2.37  1.13  1.90 
3  0.92  0.71  0.66  0.57  0.65  1.47  1.25  1.55  1.27  1.39  1.63  2.01  2.40  1.63  1.89 
4  0.78  0.76  0.67  0.58  0.68  1.65  1.31  1.33  0.95  1.31  1.65  1.65  1.62  1.31  1.61 
5 or more  0.89  0.80  0.75  0.70  0.77  1.60  1.21  1.28  1.52  1.32  1.81  1.17  1.02  1.18  1.32 
  Electricity 
  All  Relatively poor  Absolutely Poor 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  2.75  1.92  1.61  1.36  1.68  4.24  3.73  3.45  2.88  3.59  4.69  5.59  4.24  3.04  4.24 
2  2.44  1.73  1.55  1.28  1.55  3.80  3.06  2.79  2.70  3.08  4.39  4.11  2.98  2.85  3.65 
3  2.23  1.59  1.41  1.30  1.49  3.86  3.41  2.83  2.58  3.30  5.29  4.56  3.27  2.88  3.98 
4  1.96  1.65  1.47  1.40  1.56  3.57  3.01  2.44  2.49  2.97  4.72  3.81  2.64  2.21  3.85 
5 or more  2.23  1.92  1.75  1.57  1.87  3.51  2.89  2.74  2.84  3.13  3.78  3.13  2.74  3.08  3.39 
  Gas 
  All  Relatively poor  Absolutely Poor 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  2.14  2.06  2.99  3.41  2.82  2.89  2.93  5.97  7.14  4.76  2.65  2.71  6.73  7.71  5.60 
2  1.94  1.92  3.10  2.88  2.55  2.21  2.99  5.18  5.99  3.84  1.93  3.37  6.14  4.57  5.07 
3  1.62  1.85  2.55  2.54  2.27  2.52  2.77  3.83  5.14  3.65  3.36  2.56  3.15  3.65  3.37 
4  1.62  1.75  2.21  2.49  2.13  2.54  2.66  3.63  4.40  3.06  2.79  2.68  2.55  4.36  2.94 
5 or more  1.54  1.98  2.26  2.50  2.06  2.18  2.88  3.60  5.28  2.79  2.40  2.88  4.54  9.01  3.04 
  Other Fuels 
  All  Relatively poor  Absolutely Poor 
# members  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy  Warm  Tepid  Cool  Cold  Italy 
1  1.07  1.61  3.54  3.64  1.62  1.80  2.13  4.48  5.37  2.36  1.98  2.87  4.48  4.94  2.87 
2  0.92  1.85  2.96  3.64  1.61  1.46  3.34  2.79  4.77  1.97  1.69  3.04  3.38  5.88  3.04 
3  0.91  1.46  2.23  2.62  1.39  1.27  2.30  2.30  2.64  1.55  1.56  2.36  2.27  0.72  1.70 
4  1.00  1.74  2.78  3.19  1.47  1.22  1.77  2.64  1.93  1.46  1.52  2.28  6.36  4.38  1.66 
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Table 7-6: Median utility budget shares by area and type of heating, 2002. W+E: Water and 
electricity, W+E+H: Water, electricity and heating 
  No heating 
      Budget shares (%) 
   # of households 
% Relatively 
poor  Water  Electricity  Gas  Other fuels  W+E  W+E+H 
Warm  1,129,122  31.46  1.17  3.01  1.41  0.83  4.17   
Tepid  277,235  33.42  1.17  2.89  1.34  1.32  4.06   
Cool  43,710  28.26  1.20  2.22  1.33  2.35  3.43   
Cold  57,208  20.17  0.70  1.95  2.61  1.42  2.65    
Italy  1,507,275  31.30  1.14  2.91  1.50  0.93  4.05    
  Natural gas heating 
      Budget shares (%) 
   # of households 
% Relatively 
poor  Water  Electricity  Gas  Other fuels  W+E  W+E+H 
Warm  1,414,941  14.37  0.91  1.73  1.87  0.89  2.64  4.51 
Tepid  3,223,533  11.21  0.73  1.56  2.08  1.59  2.29  4.37 
Cool  2,416,730  8.55  0.70  1.43  2.75  2.13  2.13  4.87 
Cold  7,966,990  4.29  0.61  1.32  3.07  2.31  1.93  5.00 
Italy  15,022,194  7.41  0.67  1.41  2.61  1.99  2.08  4.69 
  Electricity and other fuels heating 
      Budget shares (%) 
   # of households 
% Relatively 
poor  Water  Electricity  Gas  Other fuels  W+E  W+E+H 
Warm  1,786,139  21.38  0.89  2.47  1.80  1.15  3.37  4.51 
Tepid  1,393,941  18.23  0.86  2.16  0.74  1.81  3.02  4.83 
Cool  638,629  13.50  0.83  1.89  1.26  3.22  2.72  5.95 
Cold  1,908,485  7.72  0.60  1.45  0.76  3.79  2.05  5.84 
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Table 7-7: Percentage of households with affordability problems by utility, area and family size, 
1997 
  Warm 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  Share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  15.28  23.05  23.57  18.18 
2  8.51  10.15  8.39  10.52 
3  5.38  5.37  8.09  5.91 
4  5.90  5.46  4.31  5.11 
5 or more  5.88  3.50  5.59  7.54 
Total  8.37  9.91  10.20  9.46 
  Tepid 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  8.49  14.37  18.72  14.56 
2  7.99  11.14  7.67  6.88 
3  2.81  5.00  4.08  5.13 
4  5.46  4.85  5.35  6.87 
5 or more  6.08  7.31  4.27  10.42 
Total  6.22  8.76  8.58  8.41 
  Cool 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  5.59  17.72  21.92  15.08 
2  3.47  10.09  9.32  10.09 
3  2.18  3.85  2.73  3.49 
4  1.42  2.54  2.66  4.14 
5 or more  2.32  10.15  3.33  15.99 
Total  3.11  8.68  8.89  8.56 
  Cold 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  2.57  11.42  12.46  11.60 
2  2.01  9.87  7.69  6.23 
3  1.74  6.50  6.47  7.14 
4  1.19  6.58  7.58  9.48 
5 or more  2.11  0.61  4.19  16.32 
Total  1.93  8.52  8.45  8.75 
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Table 7-8: Percentage of households with affordability problems by utility, area and family size, 
2003 
  Warm 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  Share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  13.73  19.65  23.88  12.69 
2  10.72  7.70  7.76  6.71 
3  5.28  4.78  7.16  4.22 
4  7.01  2.79  3.09  1.89 
5 or more  5.46  3.66  6.74  5.85 
Total  8.90  8.08  9.94  6.24 
  Tepid 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  6.73  13.10  21.60  11.09 
2  6.41  11.52  11.36  7.27 
3  4.66  5.44  5.37  4.85 
4  4.92  5.26  7.77  6.35 
5 or more  7.13  8.03  6.97  8.79 
Total  5.82  9.01  11.65  7.67 
  Cool 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  8.82  12.46  20.14  8.70 
2  4.94  7.93  9.37  6.66 
3  3.34  4.64  4.47  3.31 
4  3.29  4.10  5.73  4.69 
5 or more  3.55  6.69  6.12  7.80 
Total  5.04  7.44  9.89  6.08 
  Cold 
  Actual water  Affordability problems 
# members  share > 3%  Heating  Water  Electricity 
1  4.08  8.97  12.70  8.37 
2  2.85  9.25  8.98  5.02 
3  2.70  5.57  7.76  4.66 
4  1.71  6.42  9.90  7.86 
5 or more  2.88  2.77  11.09  19.68 
Total  2.94  7.61  9.96  6.92 
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Table 7-9: Percentage of households with affordability problems by utility, area and year 
  Warm 
Year  Heating  Water  Electricity  At least one 
1997  9.91  10.20  9.46  11.22 
1998  7.51  9.11  8.57  10.02 
1999  8.41  11.71  7.91  11.71 
2000  9.22  9.72  7.28  10.70 
2001  10.63  11.26  8.11  11.99 
2002  8.64  10.57  6.83  10.62 
2003  8.08  9.94  6.24  10.00 
  Tepid 
Year  Heating  Water  Electricity  At least one 
1997  8.76  8.58  8.41  10.43 
1998  7.83  8.98  8.72  10.19 
1999  10.41  15.57  9.54  15.69 
2000  13.05  14.89  11.05  15.81 
2001  12.74  14.30  10.78  15.29 
2002  9.97  12.73  8.91  13.02 
2003  9.01  11.65  7.67  11.84 
  Cool 
Year  Heating  Water  Electricity  At least one 
1997  8.68  8.89  8.56  10.19 
1998  8.71  10.41  9.43  10.99 
1999  7.12  11.00  6.90  11.06 
2000  9.26  10.89  8.18  11.28 
2001  10.11  11.67  8.25  12.09 
2002  8.57  11.73  7.75  11.87 
2003  7.44  9.89  6.08  10.04 
  Cold 
Year  Heating  Water  Electricity  At least one 
1997  8.52  8.45  8.75  10.02 
1998  7.42  8.11  7.97  9.25 
1999  6.04  9.69  5.83  9.87 
2000  8.44  10.17  7.81  10.89 
2001  9.16  10.09  7.60  11.19 
2002  7.69  10.90  7.06  11.31 
2003  7.61  9.96  6.92  10.39 
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